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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case. 
This is an Appeal by Shelby Gene Willson of the District Court's decision that an Idaho 
Transportation Department Hearing Examiner had correctly determined that Mr. Willson had not 
met his burden to demonstrate a basis existed under LC. § 18-8002A(7) to set aside the Idaho 
Transportation Department's Administrative License Suspension. The District Court affirmed the 
Hearing Examiner's decision to suspend Mr. Willson's driving privileges as a result of a failed 
evidentiary test for breath alcohol content. 
b. Party References. 
The Idaho Transportation Department is referred to as the "Department" for purposes of 
this argument. Mr. Willson is specifically referred to by name. Where "driver" is used, it is in 
reference to drivers generally. 
c. Reference to the Administrative Record. 
The Department's Administrative Record is included in the Clerk's record on appeal and 
is referenced by page and number. The Transcript of the Department's Administrative Hearing is 
referred to as the Clerk's Exhibit 1 Tr. by page and number. 
d. Factual Statement and Procedural History. 
On November 6, 2014 at approximately 1915 hours, Nez Perce County Sheriffs 
Deputy Patrick Dupea was dispatched to investigate a report of a suicidal person on Copenhagen 
Ridge Road in rural Nez Perce County. Deputy Dupea went to the reported residence looking for 
the pickup specifically identified as being driven by a specifically identified person threatening 
suicide by Nez Perce County Dispatch. Deputy Dupea did not immediately locate the pickup 
truck. Nez Perce County Dispatch was able to ping the reported suicidal persons cell phone which 
showed that the phone was being used in the Orofino area. Deputy Dupea then decided to leave 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
the residence. After travelling a few hundred yards away from the residence Deputy Dupea parked 
his vehicle and several minutes later saw headlights coming towards his location (R. p. 30). 
Deputy Dupea noticed that the vehicle approaching his location was the same blue Dodge 
Pickup that Dispatch had identified as being operated by the reportedly suicidal person. The 
pickup was driven past Deputy Dupea to the residence and parked. Deputy Dupea found the vehicle 
sitting stationary next to an outbuilding with the engine off. 
Deputy Dupea made contact with the driver, later identified as Shelby G. Willson. While 
speaking with Mr. Willson, Deputy Dupea noticed the smell of a strong odor of an alcoholic 
beverage and observed Mr. Willson to have bloodshot and extremely watery eyes. Mr. Willson 
admitted to drinking numerous alcoholic beverages (R. p. 30). 
Deputy Dupea asked Mr. Willson to perform some standard field sobriety evaluations; 
which Mr. Willson failed. Deputy Dupea then provided Mr. Willson with the ALS Advisory Form 
and observed Mr. Willson for the necessary 15 minute monitoring period before attaining alcohol 
breath samples from Mr. Willson resulting in breath alcohol concentration results of .171 and .169, 
(R. p. 31). 
Deputy Dupea then provided Mr. Willson with the Notice of Suspension of Driving 
Privileges as a result of Mr. Willson's failure of the evidentiary test for breath alcohol 
concentration, (R. p. 31 ). 
Mr. Willson timely requested a hearing with the Idaho Department of Transportation's 
Administrative Hearing Examiner (R. pp. 37-39). 
An Administrative License Suspension hearing was held telephonically on December 2, 
2014 (R. p. 45). The Department's Hearing Examiner entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order sustaining the suspension of Mr. Will son's driving privileges (R. pp. 064-072). 
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Mr. Willson timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review and the suspension of his driving 
privileges has been stayed during the pendency of this matter (R. pp. 96-98). 
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Mr. Willson's characterization of the issue on appeal appears to be limited to a question of 
whether Mr. Willson could actually be proven to be under the influence of alcohol in violation of 
Idaho driving under the influence laws. 
Mr. Willson's characterization of the issue on appeal does not properly reflect his burden 
pursuant to LC. § l 8-8002A(7) (a-e). A showing that Mr. Willson shouid not be convicted of 
driving under the influence of alcohol while operating a motor vehicle is not the issue in the 
Administrative License Suspension setting. 
Giving Mr. Willson the benefit of the doubt for purposes of characterizing the issues for 
the Court's consideration on appeal, the Department offers the following: 
1) Whether legal cause exists to stop Mr. Willson's motor vehicle, LC.§ 18-8002A(7)(a). 
2) Whether legal cause exists to believe that Mr. Willson was operating a motor vehicle 
under the influence of alcohol, LC. § l 8-8002A(7)(b ). 
Mr. Willson has waived any argument that he has met his burden pursuant to LC. § 18-
8002A(7)( c-e ). Kugler v.Drowns,119 Idaho 687, 809P.2d1116 (1991), Wheeler v. IDHW, 147 
Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988, 996 (2009). 
The duration or circumstances of the detection of Mr. Willson does not eliminate the 
reasonable and articulable suspension for the stop of Mr. Willson's vehicle, In re Suspension of 
Driver's License c~fGibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 155 P.3d II 76 (Ct. App. 2006). 
The circumstances of Mr. Willson' s arrest does not affect the analysis of whether 
Mr. Willson has demonstrated that there is not legal cause for the stop of Mr. Willson's 
vehicle or that there is not legal cause for Deputy Dupea's belief that Mr. Willson was 
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol contrary to I.C. § 18-8004. 
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Ill. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the 
Hearing Examiner that driving privileges should be reinstated because: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been 
driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation 
of the provisions of section 18-8004, l 8-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; 
or; 
( c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence 
of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 
18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
( d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating 
substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were not 
conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004( 4 ), 
Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning properly when 
the test was administered; or 
( e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) of this section. 
The review of disputed issues of fact must be confined to the agency record for 
judicial review. Idaho Code § 67-5277. 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(1) sets out the scope of review. "The Court shall not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions 
of fact." Howardv. Canyon CountyBoardo_fCommissioners, 128 Idaho 479,915 P.2d 
709 (1996). 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) provides: 
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other 
provision oflaw to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless 
the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions 
are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
( e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
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The appropriate remedy pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act is: " . 
. . if the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part and remanded 
for further proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the decision of the Department's Hearing 
Examiner must be affirmed unless the order violates statutory or constitutional provisions, 
exceeds the agency's authority, is made upon unlawful procedure, is not supported by 
substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Idaho 
Transportation Department, 137 Idaho 337, 48 P.3d 666 (2002). The party challenging 
the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in Idaho 
Code§ 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Druffel v. 
State, Dept. o(Trans .. 136 Idaho 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002). 
Further, the grounds for vacating a license suspension on judicial review are limited 
to those set out in I.C. § 18-8002A(7), State Transp. Dept. v. Kalani-Keegan, 155 Idaho 
297, 311 P.3d 309 (Ct. App. 2013). 
Appellate review of the District Court's decision requires the Court to review "the 
agency record independently of the District Court's decision", Marshall v. Dept. o_(Transp. 
137 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App. 2002). 
Mr. Willson has not set forth a sufficient legal basis to set aside the administrative 
action of the Department suspending Mr. Willson's driving privileges. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I. 
LeRal cause exists to stop Mr. Willson 's motor vehicle, IC. § l 8-8002A(7)(a). 
Mr. Willson has the burden to demonstrate that any of the five factors of I.C. § l 8-8002A(7) 
are present and having done so is entitled to not suffer an Administrative License Suspension 
imposed as a result of a failed evidentiary test for alcohol concentration. 
The Depm1ment's Hearing Examiner properly concluded that Deputy Dupea had sufficient 
legal case to stop Mr. Willson's vehicle. 1 
Legal cause has been described as a "reasonable and articulable suspicion", In re 
Swpension a/Driver's License of Gib bar, 143 Idaho 9 3 7, 15 5 P. 3d 117 6 (Ct. App. 2006). 2 
Mr. Willson essentially concedes that Deputy Dupea has legal cause to stop Mr. Willson's 
vehicle. Assuming for argument sake that Mr. Willson did not intend to make such a concession, 
1.1 Deputy Dupea was dispatched to a report of a suicidal person. 
1.2 The dispatch report noted the complainant had been getting text messages from her brother (Willson). 
1.3 The complainant stated Willson's text messages appeared to be suicidal in nature. 
1.4 While driving to Willson's residence, dispatch advised Deputy Dupea that the complainant went to her 
brother's residence and discovered his vehicle gone and no lights turned on at her brother's residence. 
1.5 When Deputy Dupea and Corporal J. Florence arrived at Willson's residence, they confirmed that 
Willson and his vehicle were not there. 
1.6 After dispatch advised the officers that Willson's cell phone company had pinged his phone in the 
Orofino area, Deputy Dupea drove and parked a few hundred yards from Willson's residence while 
Corporal Florence left the area. 
1.7 Several minutes later, Deputy Dupea observed headlights from a vehicle coming towards his direction. 
1.8 After the vehicle passed Deputy Dupea's location, Deputy Dupea observed that the vehicle was similar 
to one that Willson owned, a blue Dodge truck. 
1.9 Deputy Dupea followed the truck and observed the truck turn into Willson's residence. 
l I ODeputy Dupea turned into and drove around to the back of Willson's residence. 
1.11 Deputy Dupea observed the truck parked next to some outbuildings. 
l. l 2Deputy Dupea stopped, approached the rear of the truck, noticed the truck was not running, and observed 
a male sitting in the truck's driver's seat. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 3, R. p. 88. 
2 The standard of legal cause is something less than that of probable cause. Upon a determination that Deputy Dupea 
did not have probable cause, legal cause exists here for the stop of Mr. Willson's vehicle. A reasonable and articulable 
suspicion existed for stop of Mr. Willson's vehicle, In re Suspension of Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 
155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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there is more than sufficient legal cause in Deputy Dupea's reliance on the information supplied 
him by Nez Perce County Dispatch to stop Mr. Willson's vehicle. 
The stop of Mr. Willson' s vehicle was based on legal cause provided by the specific and 
important facts provided in the call received by Nez Perce County Sheriff's Office Dispatch 
expressing concern from the citizen informant about Mr. Willson's health and conveyed to Deputy 
Dupea through the Nez Perce County Sheriffs Dispatcher. 
Mr. Willson was reportedly texting messages to his sister who then called the Nez Perce 
County Sheriff's Office Dispatch indicating her concern that her brother, Mr. Willson could be 
suicidal. 
Deputy Dupea was advised of a personally specific concern about a specific individual in 
a specific vehicle and was dispatched to Mr. Willson's residence. 
Deputy Dupea was able to locate Mr. Willson driving back to his residence and contacted 
Mr. Willson while still in his motor vehicle after observing Mr. Willson operating the previously 
identified blue Dodge pickup truck. 
Deputy Dupea had sufficient legal cause to stop Mr. Willson's vehicle, Wilson v. Idaho 
Transp. Dept., 136 Idaho 270, 32 P.3d 164 (Ct. App. 2001). In a remarkably similar fact pattern, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals confirmed that legal cause for a motor vehicle stop exists based on the 
peace officer's reliance on an accurate citizen's report, Wilson at 274. 
Deputy Dupea was entitled to and was expected to take the information provided by the 
citizen report at face value and act appropriately. Clearly there is sufficient articulable and 
reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances, especially where the totality of the 
circumstances can include the collective knowledge of all those officers and dispatchers involved, 
State v. Harris, 130 Idaho 444, 942 P.2d 568 (Ct. App. 1997). 
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Deputy Dupea then had an obligation to approach Mr. Willson' s vehicle upon the stop of 
the blue Dodge pickup truck and determine if there was a factual basis in the Administrative 
License Suspension context for Deputy Dupea's belief that Mr. Willson was operating a motor 
vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The circumstances of the resulting detention of Mr. Willson 
have no relevance to Mr. Willson's burden in the Administrative License Suspension setting.3 
Mr. Willson failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that iegai cause did not exist for the 
stop of his vehicle. 
ISSUE 2. 
Legal cause exists to believe that Mr. Willson was operating a motor vehicle under the influence 
of alcohol, !. C. § 18-8002A(7)(b). 
Mr. Willson correspondingly and necessarily concedes that Deputy Dupea had legal cause 
to believe Mr. Willson was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol contrary to 
J.C. § 18-8004, (I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(b ). 
After these concessions of matters for which Mr. Willson has the burden, Mr. Willson 
argues that Deputy Dupea unconstitutionally extended the detention of Mr. Willson, asking the 
Department's Hearing Examiner and now the Court to conclude that the alleged unconstitutional 
nature of Deputy Du pea's continued detention of Mr. Willson is a sufficient basis to set aside the 
Administrative License Suspension. Mr. Willson cites no authority for the Court going outside 
the five factors of I.C. § l 8-8002A(7) to set aside the Hearing Examiner's decision. 
The circumstances of Deputy Dupea's continued detention of Mr. Willson is not before the 
Department's Hearing Examiner or the Court now on judicial review of the Hearing Examiner's 
decision pursuant to J.C. § 18-8002A(7)(b ). 
3 Alternatively, the stop of Mr. Willson's vehicle is an appropriate exercise of the community caretaking 
function, State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821 at 824, 54 P.3d 464 (Ct. App. 2002). 
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The Court's review of the Department of Transportation's Hearing Examiner's decision 
pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(a)-(e) is limited to the grounds set out in I.C. § 67-7952(3).4 
Additionally, Mr. Willson does not identify which provision of l.C. § 67-7952(3) is the 
basis to set aside the Hearing Examiner's decision. 
Mr. Willson does not argue that the Hearing Examiner's decision is based on an unlawful 
procedure, nor does Mr. WiUson argue that the Hearing Examiner's decision is not based on 
sufficient evidence in the Record or is arbitrary and capricious. 
Instead Mr. Willson asks that the Department's Hearing Examiner and now the Court to 
set aside the Administrative License Suspension not based on something that the Hearing 
Examiner did but based upon an allegation that something Deputy Dupea did unrelated to the 
circumstances of the Administrative License Suspension is a basis to set aside the Administrative 
License Suspension. Again Mr. Willson makes this argument without authority. 
There are two separate and distinct processes which may occur upon a failed evidentiary 
test, the Administrative License Suspension pursuant to I.C. § l 8-8002A(7) and a criminal 
prosecution for driving under the influence pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004. The actions of Deputy 
Dupea which may arguably result in evidence being suppressed in criminal proceedings does not 
affect the obligation of the Department's Hearing Examiner and the Court on judicial review to 
determine whether Mr. Willson has met his burden by a preponderance of evidence demonstrating 
that one of the factors had been met, I.C. § 18-8002A(7) (emphasis mine). 
The Department's Hearing Examiner is entitled to consider the" .... sworn statement of the 
arresting officer, and a copy of the notice of suspension and any temporary permit issued by the 
4 Idaho Code § 67-7952(3)(a) indicates that the court reviews the decision of the Department's Hearing Examiner, 
"where it's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions violates constitutional or statutory provisions" as the basis 
to set aside the decision. Clearly the it's referenced here is not the action of Deputy Dupea, but instead references the 
decision of the Department's Hearing Examiner (emphasis mine). 
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officer. ... without further evidentiary foundation", I.C. § l 8-8002A(7). There is then nothing to 
"suppress'' in the Administrative License Suspension setting, which is the apparent remedy Mr. 
Willson seeks in this judicial review of the Department's Hearing Examiner's decision. 5 
The Department's Hearing Examiner '·shall not vacate the suspension ... unless he finds 
by a preponderance of the evidence", that the circumstances ofl.C. § 18-8000 2A(7)(a)-(e) are met. 
The facts found by the Department's Hearing Examiner are independent of the 
"determination of the same or similar facts in the adjudication of any criminal charges arising out 
of the same occurrence. The disposition of those criminal charges shall not affect the suspension 
required to be imposed under the provisions of this section" for a failed evidentiary test for breath 
alcohol concentration, I.C. § l 8-8002A(7) ( emphasis mine). 
While apparently conceding that Deputy Dupea had legal cause to stop Mr. Willson's 
vehicle, Mr. Willson argues that Deputy Dupea' s extended or continued duration of the detention 
of Mr. Willson apparently eliminates Deputy Dupea' s original and still existing legal cause to 
believe that Mr. Willson was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in 
violation of I.C. § 18-8004. 
5 The Idaho Court has discussed the Idaho Transportation Department's and the Department's Hearing Examiner's 
procedural due process obligation in the Administrative License Suspension hearing process provided to the driver, 
Bell v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 151 !daho 659, 262 P.3d 1030 (Ct. App. 2011). There are no factual allegations that the 
Department's Hearing Examiner's actions offended due process. 
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It may be argued that the Idaho Court has not yet fully indicated the full extent of the 
driver's burden pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(b) when it discusses whether probable cause, a 
clearly higher standard, exists to find that the driver had not met his burden. In re Suspension of 
Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 937. 155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 2006).6 
Deputy Dupea had sufficient probable and therefore legal cause here to believe that Mr. 
Willson "had been driving or was an actual physical control of a motor vehicle whiie under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances, I.C. § l 8-8002A(7)(b )." 7 
6 
Probable cause for an arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of 
which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that 
the suspect has committed or is committing an offense. When assessing a police officer's determination of 
probable cause in the field, a court must take into consideration the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. In determining whether there 
is probable cause for an arrest, an officer is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the available 
information in light of the knowledge gained from his or her previous experience and training. (Citations 
Omitted.) 
In re Suspension of Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 2006). 
We conclude that the officer had legal cause when Gibbar weaved in and out of his lane, admitted to drinking 
alcohol, smelled of alcohol, and had bloodshot eyes. Gibbar's allegations that the field sobriety tests were 
conducted improperly and his alternative explanations for his appearance and driving do not overcome the 
evidence possessed by the officer that Gibbar was under the influence of alcohol. 
In re Suspension of Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 937 at 944, 155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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The Hearing Examiner's finding of legal cause for Deputy Dupea's stop of Mr. Willson's 
vehicle and to believe Mr. Willson was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol 
contrary to LC. § 18-8004 is supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Hearing 
Examiner's findings as to the basis of Deputy Dupea's reasonable and articulable suspicion is 
based upon substantial evidence in the record. 8 
The issue before the Department's Hearing Examiner is not the circumstance under which 
Mr. Willson may have been detained beyond a constitutionally permissible duration. The issue in 
the Administrative License Suspension setting is whether there was a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that Mr. Willson was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of LC.§ 18-8004. 
2.1 Deputy Dupea established Willson' s actual physical control of a motor vehicle. 
2.2 Competent evidence of Willson's impairment: 
a. Smelled of an alcoholic beverage 
b. Admitted to consuming alcoholic beverages 
c. Impaired memory 
d. Glassy eyes 
e. Bloodshot eyes 
2.3 Willson met the decision points on the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the walk and tum, and 
the one-leg stand standardized field sobriety tests. 
2.4 Deputy Dupea had sufficient legal cause to arrest Willson and request an evidentiary test. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order pp. 3 & 4, (R. pp. 066-067). 
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This is not a criminal case where a suppression of evidence analysis may be helpful. Mr. 
Willson's analysis of Mr. Gutierrez' successful demonstration that the results of the field sobriety 
tests should be suppressed after Mr. Gutierrez was unlawfully detained by the arresting officer is 
not the same burden Mr. Willson has pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A(7) to demonstrate a lack oflegal 
cause for Deputy Depea's belief that Mr. Willson had been operating a motor vehicle under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol, LC. § l 8-8002A(7)(b ).9 
The Gutierrez analysis of the circumstances of an extended detention after a lawful stop and 
originally lawful detention to determine whether evidence should be suppressed is not the inquiry in 
the civil Administrative License Suspension process under LC. § 18-8002A(7). The State of Idaho 
has the burden in the criminal prosecution of Mr. Gutierrez, Mr. Willson has the burden here. 
An examination of whether Deputy Dupea may have unconstitutionally extended the 
detention is not an element of Mr. Willson's proof in the Administrative License Suspension setting. 
The suppression of evidence in the criminal case does not result in the dismissal of the 
Administrative License Suspension since the two processes are clearly separate and distinct, LC. § 
l 8-8002A(7). 
Neither does the extended or continued detention of Mr. Willson eliminate Deputy Dupea's 
original legal cause to stop Mr. Willson's vehicle or Deputy Dupea's reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that Mr. Willson was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation 
of I.C. § 18-8004. Such detention if unconstitutional may affect the admissibility or "suppress-
9 
"This is an appeal from an order denying suppression of evidence found in an automobile after a traffic stop. 
Because we conclude that the police officer unreasonably extended the detention after the reason for the 
traffic stop was concluded, we reverse." The issue for the Court was whether evidence available after an 
unconstitutional detention should be suppressed in the criminal proceeding. 
State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 5 J P.3d 461 (Ct. App. 2002). 
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ability" of statements or other physical evidence in the criminal law context but not in the judicial 
review of the Department's Hearing Examiner's decision. 
This is not to suggest that a Fourth Amendment analysis is not appropriate to determine 
whether legal cause exists to believe that Mr. Willson was operating motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol contrary to LC.§ 18-8004. The reasonableness of Deputy Dupea's suspicion is 
analyzed at the time of the stop not at some later time, in re Beyer, 155 Idaho 40, 304 P.3d 1206 
(Ct. App. 2013). 10 
Mr. Willson concedes that there is a factual basis for Deputy Dupea's observation of his 
physical condition upon his admission in response to Deputy Dupea's questions about whether Mr. 
Willson had been drinking "I probably will be, I really probably will be. (R. p. 30)" Mr. Willson 
also told Deputy Dupea that Mr. Willson had "six or seven," (R. p. 30). Mr. Willson testifies but 
10 
Beyer argues that the arresting officer lacked legal cause to stop Beyer's vehicle. A traffic stop by an officer 
constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96, 59 
L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). Under 
the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417, 101 S.ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628-29 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131 
Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct.App.1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated 
upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,483, 988 P.2d 
700, 709 (Ct.App.1999). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than 
mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Id. An officer may draw reasonable inferences from 
the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and law 
enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, I 085 (Ct.App.1988). Suspicion 
will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer fell within the broad range of what can 
be described as normal driving behavior. Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561,916 P.2d at 1286 (emphasis mine). 
Beyer bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer lacked legal cause to 
stop Beyer's vehicle. A preponderance of the evidence means that the evidence shows something to be more 
probably true than not. Oxley v. Medicine Rock Specialties, Inc., 139 Idaho 476,481, 80 P.3d 1077, 1082 
(2003). Therefore, Beyer had to show that it was more probably true than not that he did not violate J.C. § 
49--644( l ). In the arresting officer's probable cause affidavit, the officer explained that he stopped Beyer for 
making an illegal right turn into the wrong lane of a four-lane road. The officer testified at the ALS hearing 
that he observed Beyer drive directly into the left lane rather than turning into the right lane of the four-lane 
road. 
In re Beyer, 155 Idaho 40, 44-45, 304 P.3d 1206, 1210-11 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied (Aug. 15, 2013). 
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does not offer either an explanation for his statement nor does he contend that Deputy Dupea's 
quotation of Mr. Willson's responses to Deputy Dupea's questions was inaccurate. Mr. Willson 
makes no factual challenge to Deputy Dupea's reported observation of Mr. Willson's condition or 
appearance. 
Mr. Willson does not meet his burden by not creating a factual question as to how much 
alcohol he might of consumed prior to operating a motor vehicle. 11 
It is Mr. Willson's responsibility to present 'evidence affirmatively' showing that Deputy 
Dupea lacked legal cause. Wheeler v Idaho Transportation Department I 48 Idaho 3 78, 382, 223 
Pacffzc 3rd 761, 765) Ct app 2009). Mr. Willson simply does not do so and fails to meet his burden 
pursuant to I.C. § l 8-8002A(7). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Willson has not demonstrated that he met his burden before the Hearing Examiner nor 
that a basis in law exists to set aside the license suspension pursuant to LC. § l 8-8002A(7). 
The Hearing Examiner's decision does not violate statutory or constitutional provisions 
and is not based on an unlawful procedure. Sufficient evidence exists in the record as a whole to 
support the Hearing Examiner's decision. 
The suspension of Mr. Willson's driving privileges should be affirmed and Mr. Willson's 
driving privileges should be suspended for ninety days. 
DATED the __ day of January, 2016. 
Special Deputy Attorney General for 
Idaho Transportation Department 
11 The lack of Mr. Willson 's contrary factual proof again indicates his concession that there was legal cause for Deputy 
Dupea's belief that Mr. Willson was operating motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol contrary to I.C. § 
18-8004. 
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I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing 
Document was: 
Mailed by regular first class mail, 
And deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
Sent by facsimile and mailed by 
Regular first class mail, and 
Deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
__ Sent by Federal Express, overnight 
Delivery 
Hand delivered 
To: Jonathan D. Hally 
Blewett Mushlitz, LLP 
710 16th Avenue 
P.O. Box 1990 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
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